On September 16, 2025, at the Combined Commanders' Conference at Fort William in Kolkata, India released its Joint Military Space Doctrine — the country's first formal articulation of how space power integrates into joint warfighting strategy. The doctrine arrived alongside the Cabinet Committee on Security's approval of Phase III of India's Space Based Surveillance programme: the launch of 52 dedicated military satellites between 2025 and 2029. And in February 2026, Space Policy 2026 revisions began — anticipated to further deregulate the sector, allowing private firms to take a lead role in manufacturing and maintaining military-grade satellite constellations.

Taken together, these developments mark a decisive transition in India's relationship with space. For seven decades, India's space programme was predominantly civilian — ISRO's domain, guided by the principle of space for peaceful purposes. That era is over. India is now building a military space architecture with the urgency, scale, and institutional commitment of a country that understands that the next war will be won or lost, in significant part, in orbit.

The Architecture India Is Building

India's military space programme in 2026 is structured around four pillars: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; secure communications; Space Situational Awareness; and counter-space capabilities.

The 52-satellite SBS-III constellation is the ISR backbone. Approved by the CCS in October 2024, the constellation is designed around a Proliferated Low Earth Orbit architecture — dozens of smaller satellites rather than a handful of large, expensive ones. This is a deliberate doctrinal choice: a proliferated constellation is far harder to degrade or decapitate in a conflict than a concentrated one. China's Yaogan-41 high-orbit reconnaissance satellite and Russia's demonstrated ASAT capabilities have made "exquisite" large satellite architectures unacceptably vulnerable. India's shift to pLEO mirrors the same architectural evolution underway in the United States Space Force and the UK Space Command.

The constellation will incorporate hybrid imaging — a combination of Synthetic Aperture Radar for all-weather, day-night surveillance and high-resolution optical sensors for detailed reconnaissance. Together, these capabilities will give India 24/7 persistent monitoring of the Indo-Pacific region, including real-time observation of the Line of Actual Control, the Line of Control, and India's maritime approaches — closing the situational awareness gap that has historically constrained India's operational decision-making in border crises.

On secure communications, GSAT-7 "Rukmini" serves the Navy, GSAT-7A serves the Air Force, and GSAT-7B — the Army's first dedicated military communication satellite — received Defence Acquisition Council approval in March 2023 and is progressing toward launch. The January 2025 launch of GSAT-20 (CMS-03) aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 — the first time ISRO used a private American heavy-lift vehicle for a critical national security asset — reflected a pragmatic willingness to prioritise capability over procurement orthodoxy.

India's Space Situational Awareness infrastructure — centred on the NETRA system — is being significantly expanded. India's own spy satellite network for counter-surveillance operations, tracking when foreign satellites are conducting reconnaissance over Indian territory, is targeted for operational deployment by end-2026. This capability represents a fundamental shift from passive awareness to active counter-intelligence in space — India will know when it is being watched.

The Counter-Space Dimension

India's Mission Shakti in March 2019 — destroying a satellite in Low Earth Orbit with a kinetic kill vehicle — established India as the fourth country after the US, Russia, and China with demonstrated ASAT capability. Since then, India has deliberately not conducted further kinetic ASAT tests, primarily to avoid contributing to orbital debris. But significant non-kinetic capability development has proceeded behind closed doors.

DRDO is developing Directed Energy Weapons — high-powered lasers capable of blinding or degrading satellite sensors — alongside electronic warfare systems for satellite jamming and spoofing of satellite communications. Cyber warfare tools for disabling adversary satellites are being developed by the Defence Cyber Agency in coordination with the DSA. India's 2025 successful test of a ground-based high-energy laser system — which placed it in an exclusive group of four countries with this capability — is directly relevant to the non-kinetic ASAT mission: a laser that can intercept and destroy a drone at low altitude can, with sufficient power scaling, degrade a satellite in low Earth orbit.

The Joint Military Space Doctrine's treatment of counter-space capabilities reflects a mature understanding that in a contested space environment, deterrence requires not just the ability to defend India's own assets but the ability to credibly threaten adversary ones. China operates approximately 290 military satellites, many of them directly supporting PLA operations in the border areas India must monitor and defend. The asymmetry is stark — and India's counter-space programme is designed to reduce it.

Private Sector, Space Policy 2026, and the Defence Industrial Base

The Space Policy 2026 revisions signal the next structural change in India's military space architecture: the formal integration of India's growing private space sector into military satellite manufacturing, launch, and maintenance. Larsen & Toubro and Tata Advanced Systems are already manufacturing components of the SBS-III constellation. The model mirrors the US commercial-defence nexus — where SpaceX's Starlink has become a critical military communication asset — and India's IN-SPACe framework is the institutional vehicle through which this integration is being formalised.

The deregulation of military satellite manufacturing for private firms will accelerate production timelines, reduce costs, and build the industrial depth that India's defence space programme requires. A single government entity — ISRO or DRDO — cannot manufacture 52 satellites on the timeline India needs. Private firms, with their supply chain efficiency and manufacturing scalability, can. The defence-commercial nexus that India is building in space is not merely an efficiency measure. It is a strategic capability multiplier.

The China Gap — And Why India Must Close It Faster

China's military space programme dwarfs India's in scale, budget, and technological maturity. China operates a constellation of over 290 military satellites, has demonstrated multiple ASAT technologies including co-orbital systems, and is developing space-based weapons including, according to the US Annual Threat Assessment 2025, possibly nuclear-capable systems in orbit. The electromagnetic pulse threat from a nuclear detonation in orbit — which could disable all communications and electronics across a vast area — is what the Indian security establishment regards as the most serious long-term space threat.

India's 52-satellite SBS-III constellation, targeted for full deployment by 2029, will meaningfully close the ISR gap with China on India's borders. The Space Policy 2026 reforms will accelerate the industrial base. The Joint Military Space Doctrine gives the architecture a strategic framework. But India must also invest in the hardening of its ground-based systems — command networks, communication infrastructure, power grids — against the EMP and cyber threats that a space-enabled adversary could deploy in a conflict's opening hours.

Space is no longer a benign domain for India. It is a contested one. India's response — deliberate, well-resourced, and increasingly sophisticated — is exactly the right one. The pace must now match the ambition.

The Hind covers policy, power, and strategic affairs from India's perspective. Views expressed are analytical and editorial.