India's defence export target — ₹50,000 crore ($6 billion) by FY2028–29 — was dismissed as wildly optimistic when it was first announced. Three years ago, India's defence exports stood at ₹21,083 crore in FY2023–24, up from a mere ₹1,521 crore in FY2016–17. Today, with exports crossing ₹23,000 crore in FY2024–25 and a pipeline of orders that includes Brahmos missiles for the Philippines and Vietnam, Dornier aircraft for multiple African customers, Pinaka rocket systems for Armenia, and Advanced Towed Artillery Guns for multiple countries, the target looks not just achievable but conservative.

India's transformation from the world's largest arms importer — a position it held for most of the past two decades — into a credible arms exporter is one of the most significant industrial policy achievements of the current era. Understanding how it happened, and where it still falls short, is essential for the decade ahead.

The Policy Architecture That Made It Possible

Three policy interventions have driven India's defence export surge.

The first is the Positive Indigenisation Lists — four successive lists that ban the import of specified defence equipment and mandate their domestic production. By creating a guaranteed domestic market for Indian defence manufacturers, the PILs have provided the production scale that makes Indian equipment cost-competitive for export. The logic is simple: a production run of 100 units for domestic use makes export pricing viable in ways that a run of 10 units for export alone does not.

The second is the Defence Acquisition Procedure's "Buy Indian" and "Buy and Make Indian" categories, which reserve procurement for domestic producers and require technology transfer for foreign vendors. Combined with the liberalisation of defence FDI to 74% under automatic route and 100% under government approval, these provisions have attracted serious foreign investment in Indian defence production — Airbus helicopters in Karnataka, Lockheed Martin in Telangana, BAE Systems across multiple platforms.

The third is iDEX — the Innovations for Defence Excellence scheme — which has funded over 400 defence startups developing everything from counter-drone systems to AI-enabled surveillance platforms. iDEX products have moved from prototype to procurement faster than the traditional DRDO pipeline, creating an agile defence industrial base that complements the large platform programmes.

The Brahmos Effect

The Brahmos supersonic cruise missile — a joint venture between India's DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia — is India's single most consequential defence export and its most globally recognised military technology brand. The Philippines' $375 million Brahmos acquisition, completed in 2024, was the first export of the system and demonstrated that Indian-developed weapons technology is operationally credible and geopolitically acceptable to US-aligned partner nations.

Vietnam, Indonesia, and the UAE are all in advanced discussions for Brahmos exports. The extended-range Brahmos-ER variant — capable of striking targets at 450 km — has significantly expanded the system's export appeal. The development of Brahmos-NG (Next Generation), a lighter, smaller variant designed for fighter jet integration, will open the system to a broader range of export customers.

The Gaps That Remain

India's defence export success is concentrated in a relatively narrow range of products — missiles, artillery, helicopters, patrol vessels, and small arms. It does not yet extend to the high-end platforms — combat aircraft, submarines, main battle tanks, and electronic warfare systems — that represent the largest share of global defence trade. Nor has India established the after-sales service, maintenance infrastructure, and long-term support ecosystem that major defence exporters build to create enduring customer relationships.

The Russia complication is the most structural gap. India's defence industrial base remains heavily dependent on Russian technology, components, and design heritage. Exporting systems with Russian-origin content to countries subject to Western sanctions or to US-aligned partners wary of Russian technology creates a market segmentation problem that India must address through accelerated indigenisation and Western technology substitution.

India is on the right trajectory. The ₹50,000 crore target, once ambitious, is now the floor — not the ceiling.

The Hind covers policy, power, and strategic affairs from India's perspective. Views expressed are analytical and editorial.